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BOOK REVIEWS

A NEVER-ENDING STUDY
Gray, Colin S. Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice. Cass Strategy and History Series, 15. New
York: Routledge, 2006. 234pp. $41.95

This volume is largely successful not
only in emphasizing the continuity and
wisdom of Colin Gray’s long-standing
defense of the study of strategy but in
capturing his delight in skewering the
latest intellectual fads in both American
and British security theory. Strategy and
History is a rich and occasionally provocative read for any student of strategy, military issues, or international
relations, and it reinforces the need to
study strategy—the relationship between military force and desired political objectives.
The introduction and very brief conclusion can stand alone as a valuable
beginning to the study of strategy and
its core themes. The first section examines the key issues in strategic studies—
the meaning of strategy itself and the
crucial use of history as a tool to understand strategy and think strategically.
The second section examines major
contemporary debates in the field of international security—nuclear targeting
and deterrence in the 1970s, the revolution in military affairs (RMA) debate of
the 1990s, and the broader issue of
arms control. The third, and arguably
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most adventurous, section illustrates
the multidisciplinary nature of strategy,
looking at geography, culture, and ethics. The first section—representing
Gray’s lifelong defense of the study of
strategy—is, not surprisingly, the strongest and most cogent; the other two
sections are more iconoclastic and, at
times, more difficult for the average
reader.
Section 1 contains five mutually reinforcing chapters, clearly articulating not
only the inherent difficulty in serious
study of strategy but its immense and
ongoing relevance for the academic,
policy maker, and war fighter. The first
chapter, written in the 1970s, attacks
the Cold War study of strategy in the
United States as both ahistorical and
technologically determinist—a theme
Gray has continued to hammer relentlessly (and properly) throughout his career. This chapter, combined with the
second essay in section 2 (on the RMA
debate) and Hew Strachan’s recent article in Survival on the co-optation of the
concept of strategy, constitutes a devastating counterargument to many of the
core assumptions of current American
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strategic thought, in both academe and
the policy world. The second chapter
addresses both the strengths and weaknesses of “new security” thinking in academe in the 1990s. This chapter could
be of particular value to political scientists and international relations
specialists.
The third, fourth, and fifth chapters of
this section should be required reading
for the modern war fighter and other
practitioners. These sections focus on
the importance of seapower and maritime strategy, on the enormous complexities involved in making strategy,
and on the paradoxes inherent in the
principles of war and in efforts to adapt
them to the changing international environment. Gray notes that the principles of war are actually principles of
warfare—intimately connected with the
tactical and operational levels of war
but remote from the fundamental issue
of waging war to achieve political ends.
The second and third sections do not
quite achieve the high standards of the
first. The second section’s focus on nuclear strategy, on the RMA debate, and
on arms control may seem antiquated
to today’s reader. Nevertheless, the notions that the RMA debate failed to
consider adversary responses to American technological superiority and that
arms control “is as likely to fuel political antagonism as prevent or alleviate
it” still have relevance to policy today.
The third section’s first chapter notes
the salient impact of geography on
strategy—an obvious point, perhaps,
but one exemplified most recently by
the problems of carrying out a counterinsurgency campaign in an Iraq with
insecure land borders on all sides. The
third chapter is a laudable effort to explain morality and ethics in international
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relations from the viewpoint of a neoclassical realist. The middle chapter, on
strategic culture, is the most daring,
and in some respects the most disappointing. Gray attempts to make a very
complex argument regarding the definition of strategic culture, but much of
the chapter is focused on a debate with
Iain Johnston, which readers unfamiliar
with this literature may find particularly daunting. This unusual chapter,
however, does not detract from the
overall value of the volume, which is
excellent not only as an introduction to
those unfamiliar with the study of strategy but also as a useful addition to the
libraries of practitioners, academics,
and military officers.
TIMOTHY D. HOYT

Naval War College

Haqqani, Husain. Pakistan: Between Mosque and
Military. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005. 380pp.
$17.95

Five years into the U.S.-led global war
on terror, Pakistan remains a cornerstone of U.S. strategy in defeating the
Taliban and rooting out al-Qa‘ida. Despite the importance of Pakistan, it is a
country that poses challenges for the
United States. A key challenge is the
dominant role of the military, which
seeks to balance its commitments as a
valuable U.S. partner with its role as
a guardian of the country’s Islamic
identity through its close relationship
with Pakistan’s religious establishment.
How Pakistan manages these commitments has serious implications for U.S.
policy. Fortunately, Husain Haqqani
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